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Abstract 
Studies investigating the question whether contractual and relational governance are 
substitutes or complements have been based on contradictory conceptualizations and 
have produced conflicting research results. This caused a controversial debate in the 
field of IS outsourcing concerning the relationship of governance mechanisms. Thus, the 
goal of this study is to clarify these inconsistencies. For this purpose we revisit the 
relationship between contractual and relational governance using a refined conceptual 
framework, which breaks down contractual and relational governance along two 
dimensions: foundation and action. Based on our framework, we conducted 21 semi-
structured interviews at a global bank for a post-hoc analysis of governance 
mechanisms within five IS outsourcing projects. Our preliminary results reveal the 
existence of dynamic patterns of interaction between the foundation dimension 
(contract, trust) and the corresponding action dimension (formal control, informal 
control) of contractual and relational governance. In contrast to previous research, they 
explain complementarity and substitution as the outcome of dynamic interactions 
between the two governance dimensions of our framework. 
Keywords:  IS Outsourcing, Governance, Relational Governance, Contractual  
Governance, Substitution, Complementarity, Dynamic Perspective 
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Introduction 
With the growing trend towards outsourcing, IS management increasingly faces the challenge of 
appropriately governing the relationship with external vendors (Dibbern et al. 2008). In search for 
theoretical guidance on outsourcing governance we consulted literature on IS outsourcing as well as 
general management. There is an ongoing debate regarding the relationship between contractual and 
relational governance (cf., Lacity et al. 2009; Poppo et al. 2002). More specifically, two conflicting views 
have arisen: the substitutional and the complementary view. The substitutional view holds that a 
complete contract reduces the need for relational governance (and vice versa), instead, the 
complementary view argues that the combined power of contractual and relational governance leads to a 
higher probability of IS outsourcing success (Poppo et al. 2002). While a number of studies have 
substantiated the substitutional view (Gulati 1995; Larson 1992; Ring et al. 1994), recent empirical results 
have supported the complementary view (Poppo et al. 2002). Other authors have found contractual and 
relational governance to be both - substitutes and complements (Klein-Woolthuis 2005; Tiwana 2010). 
Besides these contradictory results, there is also inconsistency in the underlying conceptualizations of 
contractual and relational governance. The expressions are used in three different ways: First, as actual 
actions taken to govern a relationship (i.e., exercise of formal and informal control), second, as the 
foundations of a relationship (i.e., trust and contract), and finally as a mixture of action and foundation. 
The objective of this paper is twofold: First, we seek to develop a framework that integrates and refines 
former conceptualizations. For this purpose, we propose a framework that essentially breaks down 
relational and contractual governance along two dimensions: foundation and action. Second, applying our 
integrated framework in a multiple case study we seek to improve our understanding of the formation of 
substitutional or complementary relationships between contractual and relational governance. 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in IS outsourcing governance in three ways. First, the 
framework we propose allows for a more fine-grained investigation of the relationship between 
contractual and relational governance. Second, our findings substantiate the view that this relationship is 
no static phenomenon (Fischer et al. 2011; Huber et al. 2011; Klein-Woolthuis 2005). Rather, 
complementarity and substitution are the outcome of certain recurring dynamic interaction patterns 
between the two dimensions of our integrated framework. In this sense, the dynamic interaction patterns 
serve as building blocks for complementarity and substitution. Third, our findings help to reconcile some 
of the formerly contradictory findings on IS outsourcing governance. 
Theoretical Background 
Contractual governance may be defined as “the use of a formalized, legally-binding agreement or a 
contract to govern the interfirm partnership” (Lee et al. 2006, p. 898). While this definition highlights the 
actions taken as defined in a contract (Lee et al. 2006), in other cases it is the foundation of formal action, 
i.e. the contract itself with its key attributes, such as its level of detail, or its size that is emphasized (e.g., 
Goo et al. 2009; Lacity et al. 2009). Moreover, sometimes both dimensions are mixed (e.g., Tiwana 2010). 
In order to keep both concepts separated, we will refer to formal control as the action derived from the 
contract, and foundation to refer to the contract itself (see Figure 1). 
“Relational governance covers the softer issues of managing client-supplier relationships, including trust, 
norms, open communication, open sharing of information, mutual dependency, and cooperation” (Lacity 
et al. 2009, p. 137). Again, while in some cases relational governance is mainly described by its 
foundational characteristics such as “mutual trust, commitment, and relational capital” (Lee et al. 2006, 
p. 898), in other cases the governance actions taken, such as active participation in meetings or attempts 
to understand the project team’s goals, are in the focus (Kirsch et al. 2002; Tiwana et al. 2009). Moreover, 
often both dimensions are mixed, like in the definition presented here, by conceptualizing relational 
governance as consisting of both, foundational characteristics (e.g., trust and norms) and enacted 
governance actions (e.g. harmonious conflict resolution and open communication) (Goo et al. 2009; 
Lacity et al. 2009). In the following, we refer to informal control as the action derived from a trusted 
relationship, and foundation to refer to trust itself (see Figure 1). 
As contractual and relational governance are often used in combination in IS outsourcing projects (Poppo 
et al. 2002; Sabherwal et al. 2006), their relationship gained center stage in research. Regarding this 
 Huber et al. / The Dynamic Interplay of IS Outsourcing Governance Mechanisms 
  
 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011 3 
relationship, two conflicting views have arisen - the substitutional and the complementary view. The 
substitutional view holds that contractual governance is detrimental for relational governance, while 
relational governance reduces the need for contractual regulations (Bachmann 2001). A number of 
studies substantiated this view (Larson 1992; Lee et al. 2006; Ring et al. 1994). Complementarity may be 
defined as the outcome of a reciprocal, mutual reinforcing relationship between contractual and relational 
governance (Pettigrew et al. 2001). Hence, the complementary view holds that the combined power of 
contractual and relational governance leads to a higher probability of IS outsourcing success (Goo et al. 
2009; Poppo et al. 2002). 
While a number of studies empirically substantiated the substitutional view (Larson 1992; Ring et al. 
1994), recent empirical results in the IS field challenged these findings and in turn substantiated the 
complementary view: Poppo and Zenger (2002) found empirical evidence that the level of contract 
customization is positively related with the level of relational governance and vice versa. In a study of 156 
IS outsourcing relationships Beimborn et al. (2009) strengthen this view by demonstrating that trust and 
a number of control mechanisms are positively related. Balaji and Brown (2010) investigate the impact of 
contractual and relational governance mechanisms on different dimensions of IS outsourcing success and 
find both contractual and relational governance mechanisms to have a positive impact on some of these 
dimensions. However, the authors did not investigate interaction effects between contractual and 
relational governance and therefore gave rather indirect support for the complementary view (Balaji et al. 
2010). Latest studies in the IS field on the relationship between contractual and relational governance 
draw an even more complex picture by suggesting that contractual and relational governance can be both 
complements and substitutes: Goo et al. (2009) found empirical evidence that some elements of 
contractual and relational governance act as complements, while other elements act as substitutes. These 
findings were replicated in a recent study of 120 outsourced system development projects, that 
demonstrated that formal behavior control and informal control act as complements on systems 
development ambidexterity, while formal outcome control and informal control act as substitutes (Tiwana 
2010). 
How can these contradictory results be explained? Our supposition is that this problem is closely linked to 
the underlying conceptualization: More specifically, for the debate on complements and substitutes the 
mentioned contradictions in the conceptualization may be highly problematic, as they might have an 
impact on the measured effect. As an example, Sydow and Windeler provide conceptual reasons that 
formal control (action) may have a positive influence on trust, i.e. on the foundation of relational 
governance (Sydow et al. 2003). This positive relationship between formal control (action) and trust 
(foundation) indicates a complementary relationship. However, as a consequence of increasing trust 
(foundation), informal control (action) can develop which may subsequently substitute for formal control 
(action). As shown in this example, the underlying contract remains untouched. Hence, it can be 
concluded that complementarity on the foundation level (trust and contract) might induce substitution on 
the action level. Thus, the distinction between foundation and action is important for the investigation of 
the relationship of contractual and relational governance. 
This paper revisits the relationship between contractual and relational governance with a new framework. 
The framework breaks down contractual and relational governance along two dimensions: foundation and 
action. Foundation refers to the basis of governance mechanisms, i.e. contract for contractual governance, 
and trust for relational governance1. We will use informal control to refer to the action based on trust 
(e.g., open communication) and formal control for the action derived from the contract2 Figure 1 (see a). 
Complementarity and substitution are reflected in the connections between the four governance 
parameters (trust, contract, formal and informal control) of the framework. On the one hand, a 
substitutional relationship is characterized by at least one negative connection between relational and 
contractual governance. On the other hand, complementary is the outcome of reciprocal relationships 
                                                             
1 We choose trust as foundation, because it is seen as a precondition for any social life (Luhmann 2000), 
and more specifically trust can be “viewed as a necessary condition for relational governance“ (Goo et al. 
2009). 
2 We use the terms formal and informal control mechanisms to refer to their position on a formality 
continuum, whereas formal means “officially sanctioned”(Cardinal et al. 2010). 
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(Pettigrew et al. 2001) and therefore it manifests in two successive positive connections between the 
contractual and relational dimension (see Figure 1b, c and d). 













Figure 1. Conceptual Framework, Substitution and Complementarity Patterns 
Method 
A case study approach was chosen, as it is particularly appropriate for studies investigating “why” and 
“how” questions (Miles et al. 1994) and for the investigation of contemporary phenomena which defy 
control by the researcher (Yin 2003). Clearly these criteria apply to the relationship of governance 
mechanisms in IS outsourcing. 
Striving for generalization, we followed (literal) replication logic (Yin 2003) and selected five similar IS 
outsourcing cases at a leading German bank (“BANK”). Projects were chosen based on a purposeful 
sampling strategy (Eisenhardt 1989; Patton 2002). All selected projects had to be similar in size of vendor 
and project. Moreover, a minimum project duration of six month was decided on, to assure that trust can 
develop (Larson 1992). In order to reduce potentially confounding effects of organization (Hofstede 1991), 
we selected cases from the same department - the HR department. BANK has recently outsourced a 
number of IS-intensive business processes in the area of recruiting and payment. The vendor companies 
are responsible for software development, application service provisioning (ASP) or IS supported business 
processes (see Table 1). 
As our intention was to gain an in-depth understanding of the relationship of governance mechanisms in 
IS outsourcing the data was gathered through 21 semi-structured interviews with key client and vendor 
personnel. Data analysis followed a three step approach. Using our refined framework as an analytical 
lens we first identified dynamic patterns of interaction between the four governance parameters of our 
framework (trust, contract, formal control, informal control). In a second step, each interaction pattern 
was classified as either a building block for complementarity or substitution, based on unidirectional 
positive or negative connections between contractual and relational governance. Finally, we revisited the 
data to identify sequences of the dynamic patterns of interaction that together constitute complementarity 
(positive connections in opposite directions).  
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Table 1: The Analyzed IS Outsourcing Cases 
Case 
Name Project Description 
No. of 
Interviews 
TALENT ALPHA delivers an online application for managing 




BETA delivers an online application for managing the 
graduate recruiting process. 
4 
 
RECRUIT GAMMA delivers an online workflow management 
application for the entire recruitment process. 
4 
PAYROLL DELTA processes the payroll for BANK’s Indian operations. 6 




The analysis of the dynamic interplay between contractual and relational governance has revealed four 
patterns of interaction (Fischer et al. 2011). By applying the new framework on this dynamic interplay of 
contractual and relational governance, we were able to disentangle the complex interplay on different 
levels (action / foundation) and dimensions (contractual / relational). 
The first dynamic pattern of interaction and the related interplay of foundation and action are illustrated 
by the following example (see Figure 2): The contract (foundation), which was agreed between the BANK 
and one of its vendors contained schedules for specific regular governance meetings. Hence, attending 
these governance meetings is a formal action. Within these meetings, social interaction took place and 
consequently client and vendor employees started to trust each other. The development of trust promoted 
informal control, when after a while a “continuous communication flow”, i.e. informal communication in 
addition to formal communication unfolded. As this pattern of interaction shows a unidirectional positive 
impact of contractual on relational governance, we classify it as building block for complementarity.  
 
Figure 2. First Pattern of Interaction 
A second dynamic pattern of interaction is illustrated with the following example (see Figure 3). In one of 
the investigated cases the vendor was responsible to deliver defined software functionalities via web 
interface for BANK. Over time the parties had developed a trustful relationship (foundation). When 
BANK’s employees asked for further functionalities, which where “not part of the contract” this trusted 
relationship allowed the parties to elicit the software requirement informally (action) “on the phone”. This 
informal interaction gave access to knowledge which would otherwise be hard to get (knowledge about 
requirements, i.e. the knowledge “what they [the client personnel] want”) and it was subsequently used to 
refine the contract when the agreed outcomes were described in a written specification that became an 
“addendum to the contract” (foundation). Subsequently, the vendor delivered as agreed by providing 
these additional software functionalities for BANK (action). Hence, in this case the dynamic pattern of 
interaction shows a positive impact of relational governance on contractual governance and therefore we 
classify it as a building block for complementarity. Although both the first and the second pattern can be 
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seen as building blocks of complementarity, there is an important difference between them - the direction 
of causality. The first pattern describes how elements of the contractual dimension (meetings are agreed 
on and subsequently held) exert a positive influence on the relational dimension (trust develops and 
enables informal communication), while in the second pattern it is the other way around, i.e. the 
relational dimension (trusted relationship enables informal knowledge exchange) exerts a positive 
influence on the contractual dimension (contract is refined and software subsequently delievered). 
 
Figure 3. Second Pattern of Interaction 
A third dynamic pattern of interaction was particularly visible in cases, where on the one hand the role of 
the contract was mentioned as very important but on the other hand the employees had only very limited 
knowledge of the specific clauses. As an example, we introduce the operational level agreement (OLA), 
which was used as an operational instance of the contract, in one of our IS outsourcing cases. The OLA 
contains information on procedures which are important for the day-to-day business (foundation). 
However, in this case, these formal control mechanisms were not enacted, instead cooperation between 
client and vendor was characterized by open communication and information exchange (action). Hence, it 
is the awareness of the contract which reduces the perceived risk of misconduct. This is illustrated by the 
following quote: 
“As long as collaboration based on partnership via phone and email works, it is a nice thing and if 
it does not work that well, it is something what acts supporting, as something to rely on.” 
As described by the interviewee, the contract backs up for cases of trouble. As a consequence client and 
vendor employees dared to rely on informal control (action) (“collaboration based on partnership via 
phone and email”) (cp. Figure 4). In line with previous literature (Inkpen et al. 2004) this informal 
interaction between client and vendor, subsequently fostered the development of trust (foundation).  
Again, this dynamic pattern of interaction which illustrates a positive impact of contractual governance on 
relational governance can be classified as a building block for complementarity.  
 
Figure 4. Third Pattern of Interaction 
Finally, the fourth observed dynamic pattern of interaction describes a substitutional relationship 
between informal control (action) and the contract (foundation). 
One of the cases was a captive offshoring project. To handle this kind of projects, BANK has approved a 
“Captive Offshoring Methodology (COM)”. COM comprises five consecutive phases and the completion of 
each phase can be seen as a movement towards a higher degree of contractual completeness. In one case 
client and vendor knew each other from a successful precursor project and had established a trustful 
relationship (foundation), which manifested itself by frequent social interaction with high levels of 
informal information exchange (action). Interestingly, some of the prescribed phases of the COM 
methodology were omitted consciously (“in this case … we didn’t need to do” all phases). This intended 
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skipping of phases can be interpreted as a move towards a lower degree of contractual completeness 
(foundation). Nevertheless, the resulting wiggle room was not perceived as risky but as contractual 
flexibility “now it is much quicker to produce [an addendum to the contract]”.  
Still, the smaller amount of documentation was legally binding and as a result, formal control developed 
(action). The main distinguishing mark, compared to the three preceding patterns of interaction is the 
negative influence of contractual governance on relational governance and therefore we classify this 
dynamic interaction pattern as substitution (cp. Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Fourth Pattern of Interaction 
As complementarity is the outcome of a reciprocal or mutual reinforcing relationship between governance 
mechanisms, the identified building blocks and the one-way relationship they describe are only indicators 
for complementarity. However, sequences of the building blocks can be interpreted as complementarity. 
Therefore, we scanned our data for such sequences of different interaction patterns (Huber et al. 2011). 
The next section will give an illustrative example for one of the sequences we  examined by applying our 
framework (also cp. Figure 6).  
An example from our data showed that in one case BANK had contractually defined a few initial meetings 
with its vendor to become acquainted with the vendor personnel. The meetings took place (12 in Figure 
6a) and after a while, people started to trust each other (23 in Figure 6a). As a result of this good 
rapport, the employees agreed informally to regularly keep in touch with each other by ad-hoc and regular 
conference calls (34 Figure 6a and b). Later on, the regularly calls were anchored in the contract (45 
in Figure 6b). From this point in time the regular conference calls may be classified as formal action (56 
in Figure 6b). Summarizing this interplay of dynamic interaction patterns over time leads to the combined 
diagram in Figure 6c, which contains the first two patterns of interaction. This illustration shows the 
mutual reinforcing relationship of contractual and relational governance over time, i.e. complementarity. 
However, this complementary relationship draws attention to an interesting phenomenon - the joint 
occurrence of complementarity and substitution (Figure 6d). When irregular ad-hoc calls (informal 
action) are replaced by regular contractually prescribed calls (formal action), then there is a substitutional 
relationship on action level, while at the same time, the complementary relationship on foundation level 
remains. This is not a marginal issue, as investigating the same phenomenon without distinguishing 
between action and foundation would have revealed different relationships. As an example, if contractual 
and relational governance would have been conceptualized solely as the actions taken, the same 
phenomenon would have been understood as substitution.  
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First Pattern of 
Interaction  
(cf. Figure 2) 
a) 
Second Pattern  
of Interaction  







Substitutes at the 
Same Time 
d) 
Figure 6. Sequence of Interaction Patterns (Example) 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to revisit the relationship between contractual and relational governance 
with a refined framework. Applying the framework revealed some basic patterns of interaction, which 
describe positive or negative unidirectional impacts between the two governance mechanisms. The 
negative pattern explains a substitutional relationship. The positive ones, if taken alone, do not qualify as 
complementarity, because complementarity is the outcome of reciprocal, mutually reinforcing 
relationships. However, we found that the dynamic patterns of interaction occur in sequences. As each 
pattern of interaction describes a positive unidirectional impact between governance mechanisms, the 
occurrence of the dynamic patterns of interaction in sequences can be interpreted as complementarity. In 
this sense the dynamic patterns of interaction are building blocks for complementarity over time. 
Summing up, the main contribution of our study is that it sketches the relationship between contractual 
and relational governance as much more complex than indicated by extant literature (e.g., Goo et al. 
2009; Poppo et al. 2002). This higher degree of complexity manifests in two respects. First, the 
relationship between contractual and relational governance, i.e. substitution or complementarity, is 
changing over time. At one point in time contractual and relational governance act as substitutes at 
another point in time they act as complements. This is based on the finding that the dynamic patterns of 
interaction sometimes occur in sequences. This sheds light on the contradictory results of former research 
as it emphasizes that the role of time should not be neglected by analyzing the relationship of governance 
mechanisms. Second, the relationship between contractual and relational governance may vary for 
different governance dimensions. More specifically, complementarity on the foundation level may come 
along with or even cause substitution on action level and vice versa. Both findings give clear hints why 
former research has produced contradictory results: 
First, when the relationship between contractual and relational governance changes over time, then the 
interval between cause and effect is not arbitrary (e.g., McGrath 1988; McGrath et al. 1986). This implies 
that the time interval between cause (e.g. a contract that prescribes social interaction) and effect (e.g. 
well-attuned relational governance which developed from this social interaction) is of major importance 
because in this case the observed relationship is dependent on the measuring point. Hence, contradictory 
findings in the complements vs. substitutes debate could be an artifact of the chosen or neglected interval. 
Second, when the relationship between contractual and relational governance varies for different 
governance dimensions, then the prior conceptual blur (i.e., no explicit distinction between foundation 
and action) might have caused some of the contradictory results. This is an important issue as there are 
theoretical and empirical (cf., results section) reasons that suggest a causal link between complementarity 
on the foundation dimension and substitution on the action dimension: If the contract (Maitland et al. 
1985) or distinct contractual clauses (Goo et al. 2009) really foster trust - which would indicate a 
complementary relationship - then the consequence of this increased trust might be that contractually 
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prescribed rules are no more exercised, in favor of informal agreements between client and vendor (i.e., 
substitution on action level) (Das et al. 2001; Inkpen et al. 2004). It is important to note that in this case 
the very reason for substitution on the action level is the increased trust that was a consequence of prior 
complementarity on the foundation level. Hence, conceptualizing contractual and relational governance 
solely as the actions taken or solely in terms of foundational characteristics blocks the visibility of 
different effects on different levels. In contrast, our framework allows us to empirically substantiate the 
conjecture that complementarity on the foundation level (trust and contract) might induce substitution on 
the action level. However, although the preliminary results of this study point to this direction, this 
presumption has to be verified in future research. 
Moreover, our framework spans a solution space for dynamic interaction patterns between the foundation 
of governance mechanisms (trust and contract) and their enactment as formal and informal control. The 
framework enables the deduction of additional dynamic interaction patterns that may occur in reality but 
that we have not found in our cases. The framework can guide future research by providing an 
interpretive lens through which dynamic interaction patterns can be analyzed and operationalized.  
Though our research is not yet completed, we see our preliminary results as a first step towards a process 
theoretic approach (Mohr 1982) for investigating IS outsourcing governance. In this context, the dynamic 
patterns of interaction could be modeled as necessary conditions for complementarity, whose occurrence 
in a distinct chronological order could explain the phenomenon of complementarity. Moreover, when 
interaction patterns occur in sequences they might form paths towards governance success or failure. 
Therefore, they could take an important role in explaining the evolution of governance mechanisms in IS 
outsourcing projects. 
Limitations and Research Outlook 
We recognize that this study is subject to limitations, but some of them may be mitigated within our 
upcoming research. First, we use data from one client company. While this helps to control for 
heterogeneity, it otherwise limits generalizability. Thus, we aim for a replication study to compare our 
findings within at least one different firm environment (Leonard-Barton 1990). Second, we currently have 
relied on retrospective data instead of longitudinal data. Therefore, we are planning a second round of 
interviews with BANK and its vendors. 
When contractual and relational governance can be both substitutes and complements, another important 
question for future research would be to investigate  conditions that influence whether the relationship 
between contractual and relational governance switches from complementarity to substitution and vice 
versa. In this context a valuable direction could be to classify governance dynamics by their magnitude as 
either revolutionary or evolutionary change (Romanelli et al. 1994). Following Van de Ven and Poole (Van 
de Ven et al. 1995) evolutionary and revolutionary changes are driven by generative mechanisms (motors 
of change). On the one hand, decisions on governance mechanisms in revolutionary periods are driven by 
rational choices (Van de Ven et al. 1995) and therefore it follows that these decision might concern both 
contractual and relational governance mechanisms (i.e. the entire system of mechanisms). Consequently, 
more (or less) of one type of governance mechanism might go along with more (or less) of the other type 
(e.g. an increase in relational governance might be accompanied with an decrease in contractual 
governance). Or put another way, revolutionary changes might go along with substitution. On the other 
hand, decisions on governance mechanisms in evolutionary periods are rather characterized by constant 
adaptations of some mechanisms (Sitkin 1992) instead of questioning and re-planning the entire 
portfolio. Consequently, such a change might result in an adding of some type of governance mechanism 
without subtracting another. Hence, these periods might (over time) go along with a complementary 
relationship between contractual and relational governance. However, these theoretical suppositions 
remain to be tested in future research. 
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